Washington’s Taiwan doctrine of “strategic ambiguity” should be switched to “strategic clarity” as a better deterrent, argued Mr Hammond-Chambers.

According to the Times of Israel, the US-based Arms Control Association reports Iranian missiles are largely based on North Korean and Russian designs and enhanced with Chinese technology.

Fu S Mei, the director of the New York-based Taiwan Security Analysis Centre, said Beijing had likely learned from Iran’s failed assault about the feasibility of intercepting slower-moving drones and cruise missiles launched over significant distances that allowed sufficient reaction time.

But he said the Chinese leadership may not be too concerned if they believed their own missiles and drones were of better quality, with greater precision and ability to penetrate air defences.

“These missiles are also likely to fly less than half the distances, thus affording significantly less reaction time and battlespace for engagement by the defences,” he said.

Shorter range requirements would lower costs, allowing the deployment of a larger number of missiles.

Taiwan, too, could learn from Israel’s successful defence model, which combined robust integrated air and missile defence system (IAMDS), appropriate sensors, and integrated command and control with assistance from allies.

Taiwan “already possesses many of these key components” but needed to improve battle management systems and find ways to secure assistance from the US and other regional partners, he said.